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I. INTRODUCTION

Every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right
to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may
say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that
Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and
joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property.
... Thus Labour, [and not the state or the law], in the Beginning, gave a
Right of Property.
John Locke's idea that the right of property comes from the work of an
individual and not the state lays the foundation for the United States' determination
of property rights in conjunction with the government's eminent domain power.2
The German Basic Law, 3 on the other hand, follows the writings of Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, where the unmitigated pursuit of private property is looked upon with
suspicion.4 The German Basic Law attempts to balance an individual's property

1. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT 287-88, 299 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press,
2d ed. 1960) (1690).
2.

See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENTOFPOLrICAL DISCOURSE 32-40 (1991)

[hereinafter GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK] (addressing the influence of Rousseau on European constitutions and Locke's
influence on the United States).
3.

See infra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.

4. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ONINEQUALITY 55 (Patrick Coleman ed., Oxford University
Press 1984) (1755) ("You are lost if you forget that the fruits of the earth belong to all and that the earth itself
belongs to no one").
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rights with the need for property that benefits the public. 5 The difference in the
foundation of Takings law between two economic superpowers lends itself to allow
manner each country determines individual property
for a general comparison of the
6
rights in a takings analysis.
This Comment compares United States and German theories of property rights
to determine how each country balances the competing interests of their citizens and
government. Part II of the Comment outlines the development of the United States'
takings analysis, focusing on U.S. Supreme Court decisions introducing "tests" to
guide the inquiry.7 Part I introduces the German Basic Law and explains the
development of present day expropriations. The purpose of this section is to lay a
foundation for Germany's view of property rights. Part III also discusses the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) and how it tries to incorporate Member States'
constitutional guarantees into a community legal order for the individual states of
the European Union. Part IH considers the effects of the ECJ on German property
law. Finally, Part IV compares the different aspects of a takings analysis in the
United States and Germany using the Takings Clause from the U.S. Constitution as
a guideline. Each element of the Clause will be compared with its German
equivalent to show that the German Basic Law is distinct facially from the U.S.
Constitution, but is similar in its application.
II. THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES

A. The History of the Takings Clause
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that "no person shall...
be deprived of... property without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation."8 The second part of this
Amendment is commonly referred to as the Takings Clause. Its purpose is "to bar
government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all

5.
Grundgesetz [Constitution] art. 14 (F.R.G.).
6.
Due to the further expansion of our borderless society it is important for practitioners to understand the
property laws of other countries. With a greater number of international companies moving employees into foreign
countries, there is a need to understand fundamental property rights of the individual in more than the United States.
7.
See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); see generally Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255 (1980). Because the United States has developed relatively clear cut rules when dealing with physical takings,
the focus of Part H will rest on drawing the line between a regulatory taking and a valid act of the police power.
8.
U. S. CONsT. amend. V; see also Otto J. Hetzel and Kimberly A. Gough, Assessing the Impact ofDolan
v. City of 7igardon Local Governments' Land-UsePowers, in TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND
REGULATORY TAKINGS AFIERDOL4NANDLuCAS219, 222 (1996) (setting forth the two clauses of this amendment
while noting that the Fifth Amendment is directly applicable only to the federal government, but has been applied
to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment which contains a due process clause identical to that provided
in the Fifth Amendment); see generally Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897) (applying the Fifth Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
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fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 9 The Takings Clause
has fulfilled its purpose by developing requirements which place limits on the
government's eminent domain power.'°
1. Developing the Takings Clause
Today, the Takings Clause analysis includes regulatory as well as physical
deprivations of property. When James Madison originally proposed the clause it
stated, "No person shall be ... obliged to relinquish his property, where it be
necessary for public use, without a just compensation."'' 2 Under this proposed, but
eventually rejected, version of the Takings Clause, private property could be
regulated by the government without compensation being paid to the property
owner. 13 Madison intended the clause to apply only to "direct, physical taking of
property by the federal government."' 4 The rejected version of the Takings Clause
did not provide protection to private property from extreme governmental
regulation.' 5 Instead, governmental regulation was seen as a power granted to the
government regardless of its effects on private persons or their property. 6 The
prevailing version balanced the need for governmental regulation with the need for
just compensation.' 7 This balance reflects Madison's feelings that a government

9.
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 834 n.4 (1987). The
Takings Clause does not explicitly identify the type of governmental action that will constitute a taking. Hetzel and
Gough, supranote 8, at 222.
10. See infra notes 25-41 and accompanying text (discussing the components of the Takings Clause, such
as, property must be taken for a public use and just compensation is required to be paid when property is taken,
which limit the governments ability to arbitrarily take property).
11. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.15 (1992) (applying the Takings
Clause to a regulation which deprived the property owner of his intended use of the land); see also Loretto v.
Telepromprompter Manhattan CATVCorp., 458 U.S. 419,426 (1982) (presenting apermanent physical occupation
of property).
12. James Madison, Speech in Congress ProposingConstitutionalAmendments (June 8, 1789), in JAMES
MADISON: WRrnNGS 437,442-43 (1999).
13. See id.;
see also THEODOREJ. NOVAK, ET. AL., CONDEMNATION OFPROPERTY § 1.6, at 6 ("a government
may regulate use and enjoyment of the owner's property, or... deprive the owner of the beneficial uses of it,
without compensation other than the sharing of the resulting general benefits").
14. William M. Treanor, Note, The Originsand OriginalSignificance of the Just Compensation Clause of
the FifthAmendment, 94 YALE L. J. 694,710-11 (1985) (addressing James Madison's concern for the protection of
physical property and not for the protection of property which is being restricted by a regulation imposed by the
federal government).
15. See Hetzel and Gough, supra note 8, at 223.
16. See Treanor, supra note 14, at 694-700 (establishing the need for a just compensation clause in the
Takings Clause in order to prevent the states from abridging individual property rights and to promote common
interests without requiring restitution).
17. See id at712 (quoting James Madison that the requirement ofjust compensation evidences "pride... in
maintaining the inviolability of property" by recognizing a "wide range of personal and property rights").
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which provided compensation after taking real or personal property demonstrated
its commitment to personal freedom.18
The modem Takings Clause "serves as a fulcrum upon which private property
interests are balanced against the police power." 19 Under the police power, the
government is permitted to regulate property in order to protect the health, safety,
morals, and general welfare of the public. 20 Implementation of the police power
infringes on property rights to prevent harm to a public interest, whereas eminent
domain takes property for a public use. 1 Due to the different purpose of the exercise
of the police power, unlike the power of eminent domain, no compensation is
required when it causes imposition on or acquisition of private property.22 Just
compensation is only required where there are constitutional takings which infringe
"beyond the authority permitted by governmental police powers." a Thus, the
Takings Clause, as it is stands today, allows the government to regulate the use and
enjoyment of private property, even if the regulation deprives the owner of some of
the land's beneficial uses.24
2.

The Components of the Takings Clause

The modem Takings Clause can be divided into four components: private
property, public use, just compensation, and taking.2 Private property is defined as
"property-protected from public appropriation-over which the owner has

18. SeeJamesMadison,Property,Nat'l Gazette (Mar.29,1792), in JAMEsMADISON:WRTINGS 515,515-16
(1999); see also Treanor, supra note 14, at 712 (presenting Madison's fear that to directly violate a person's
property undermined an individual's right to personal freedom).
19. Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, the Supreme Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, in TAKINGS: LANDDEvELOPMENTCOND1TIONSANDREGULATORYTAKINGSAFrERDOL4NANDLUCAS 107,107 (1996) (noting that the
balancing approach for a present day takings analysis is difficult due to the fact that "both property and the police
power are indeterminate concepts that change over time and from place to place").
20. See Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659,669 (1878). Northwestern Fertilizing Co. was organized
pursuant to a charter which allowed it to manufacture and convert dead animals into agricultural fertilizer in Cook
County, Illinois. See id. at 663. In March 1869 the charter was revised to give the local government the power to
abate nuisances. See id.at 664. Fertilizing Co. was found to be a nuisance. See id. The Court found that the
ordinance revising the charter was a valid act of the police power due to the need to protect others from injury. See
id. at 668. The Court stated "pure air and the comfortable enjoyment of property are as much rights belonging to
it as the right of possession and occupancy." See id. at 669; see also NOVAK, Er. AL., supranote 13, § 1.6 at 6.
21. See NOVAK Er. AL., supranote 13, § 1.6 at 6; see also Hetzel and Gough, supra note 8, at 222 ("The
eminent domain power permits the government to acquire, confiscate, or otherwise take private property for public
use without an owner's consent").
22. See Hetzel and Gough, supranote 8, at 222; see also NOVAK ET. AL., supranote 13, § 1.6 at 6.
23. Hetzel and Gough, supra note 8, at 222; see also RIcmARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THEPOWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 198 (1985) (stating that "The issue of compensation... can be reached only
if there has been a taking of private property, if it is for public use, and if the taking is not justified under the police
power or by the doctrines of consent and assumption of risk").
24. See Hetzel and Gough, supranote 8, at 222 (explaining "The Bill of Rights, with the Fifth Amendment
in its current form, was ratified in 1791").
25. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V; see also Hetzel and Gough, supranote 8, at 223-24 (analyzing the Fifth
Amendment by breaking its literal language into four distinct elements).
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exclusive and absolute rights. 26 Whether property is personal or real, tangible or
intangible, it is included within the definition of private property for purposes of a
takings analysis. 27
The next component of the Takings Clause, the public use requirement, though
still a requisite in the modem day takings analysis, may have diminished in
significance.28 Eminent domain cases have repeatedly held that "one person's
property may not be taken for the benefit of another private person without a
justifying public purpose, even though compensation [may] be paid., 29 The Court
has concluded where there is a rational relationship between the public purpose and
the use of the eminent domain power, the action is not a taking.3 ° Some scholars
argue the public use requirement has lost all practical significance whenever an
elected body authorizes the taking of private property because of the decisions in
32 These cases hold that
HawaiiHousingAuthority v. Midkiff 1 and Berman v. Parker.
legislative action taking private property is conclusive of public use.33
The third component of the Takings Clause, just compensation, is the most
obscure component of the Takings Clause because the Fifth Amendment neglects

26. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1233 (7th ed. 1999); see also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE CONSTrTUTION 97-98 (1977) (defining private property by distinguishing between things that belong to
you and things that belong to others, and an individual's responsibility to use those things that belong to him in
ways that do not injure others). "Private property is a fundamental institution of American life." Id. at 97 (emphasis
supplied).
27. See NOVAK, Er. AL., supra note 13, § 2.2, at 10 (discussing how the Takings Clause delineates
application to the taking of private property, which most read to mean real property, without announcing the
application to different forms of property); see also Treanor, supra note 14, at 710-11 (implying that the originally
proposed Taking Clause concerned only real property).
28. See Hetzel and Gough, supranote 8, at 224 (discussing the effects of Berman v. Parker,348 U.S. 26
(1954) and HawaiiHousing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)).
29. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229,241 (1984) (claiming that the public use element
of the Fifth Amendment is "coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers," thus arguing that the
element of public use is one that falls within the power of the legislature with minimal review to be done by the
courts).
30. See id.; see also Hetzel and Gough, supra note 8, at 224 (discussing the lack of practical significance
that the public use requirement has after Berman v. Parker,348 U.S. 26 (1954) and Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)).
31. 467 U.S. at 243-44 (stating that the "mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is
transferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries does not condemn that taking as having only a private
purpose"). The "government does not itself have to use property to legitimate taking; it is only the taldng's purpose,
and not its mechanics, that must pass scrutiny" under the Takings Clause. Id. at 244.
32. 348 U.S. at 31 (finding that the District of Columbia's urban renewal was a public use, although the
resulting structures would be operated by private agencies). This case dealt with the District of Columbia
Redevelopment Act which appropriated appellants department store in order to "develop a better balanced, more
attractive community." Id. The Court went on to say that "if those who govern the District of Columbia decide that
the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in
the way." Id. at 33.
33. See Hetzel and Gough, supra note 8, at 224; see also Berman, 348 U.S. at 32 (stating, "when the
legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive").
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to outline any standards of fairness to determine just compensation. Due to the lack
of standards set out in the Fifth Amendment, courts have implemented their own
methods of determining the value of just compensation. Generally, just
compensation is equivalent to the fair market value of the property at the time of the
taking, calculated considering:
The price that an informed and knowledgeable purchaser would offer a
willing seller for the land and any buildings, structures, or other
improvements considered to be a part of the property, with neither party
being under any duress or compulsion. Market value is generally considered
in terms of the property's highest and best use which would be reasonably
possible in the near future.3 5
The factors used to determine fair market value include market demand, economic
development in the area, specific plans to develop the land, particular uses permitted
by zoning ordinances, perceived compatibility with neighboring areas, and the
actual use of the property at the time of the taking.36 However, because the Takings
Clause is not limited to the physical seizure of land, the fair market
value standard
37
for the just compensation requirement remains difficult to apply.
The last component of the Takings Clause is the taking itself. Some argue that
a constitutional taking, requiring just compensation, occurs only when the
government actually physically seizes private property.3 8 However, the Supreme
Court has found that takings are not limited to physical occupation by the
government, but include circumstances when land has been unconstitutionally
regulated. 39 Through the years the Supreme Court attempted to define a functional

34. See United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949). "The Court in its construction of the constitutional
provision has been careful not to reduce the concept of 'just compensation' to a formula." Id.
35. NOVAK, ETAL.,supra note 13, §§ 15.2,15.3, at 124-25 (citation omitted). "Although market value is the
general rule, not all properties have an ascertainable market value and courts may look beyond the market value
concept and base their awards on other concepts of value." Id. § 15.2, at 124; see also Cars,337 U.S. at 332
(discussing how factors may be added or taken away to account for a "special value").
36. See id § 15.3, at 125 (citation omitted).
37. Hetzel and Gough, supra note 8, at 223-24 (stating that some argue that the just compensation
requirement of the Takings Clause should only apply to "physical seizures of private property by the government");
see also Treanor, supra note 14, at 711-12 (presenting the possibility that arguments made to limit just
compensation to physical takings may be based on Madison's initial intention that the Takings Clause only apply
to physical deprivations of property).
38. See Hetzel and Gough, supranote 8, at 225 (stating that the framers ofthe Constitution intended the just
compensation requirement to apply only to physical takings).
39. See id.(arguing that the government does have the power to regulate property, through a valid act of the
police power, but stating that there is a point where regulation is recognized as a compensable taking).
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takings analysis that would govern the different categories of takings.40 The Court
did this by referring to precedent set by previously decided cases.4'
B. The Development of a Takings Analysis
Defining what constitutes a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment has been
problematic.42 Justice Rehnquist acknowledged this when he stated:
This Court has generally "been unable to develop any 'set formula' for
determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries
caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than
remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons." Rather, it has
examined the "taking" question by engaging in essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries that have identified several factors-such as the economic impact
of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed
expectations, and the character of the governmental action-that have
particular significance. 43
The Supreme Court's inability to articulate a bright line test for determining when
governmental regulation has crossed the line from a valid act of the police power
into a taking requiring compensation, has caused uncertain jurisprudence in this
44
area.
Early takings law required the government to physically seize an individual's
private property before the property owner was entitled to compensation.
Illustrative in Mugler v. Kansas,46 where the Court found if a property owner was
using his property in a way that damaged others, the government could prohibit the

40. Id.
41. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); see generally Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255 (1980).
42. See Penn Cent. Transp. Company v. City ofNew York, 438 U.S. 104,123 (1978). Penn Centralinvolved
exploitation of the airspace above Grand Central Terminal after it was designated a landmark. Id. at 104. The Court
found that the restrictions imposed on UGP Properties, the contractor, were substantially related to the promotion
of the general welfare and thus did not constitute a taking. Id. at 138.
43. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (citation omitted). The Court held that the
government's attempt to create a public right of access to the improved pond goes far beyond ordinary regulation
involved in condemnation cases, thus the action amounted to a taking requiring just compensation. Id. at 178.
44. See Hetzel and Gough, supra note 8, at 225 n.43 (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7, for the proposition that "uncertainty regarding the composition of the denominator in our
'deprivation' fraction has produced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court").
45. See The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 551 (1871). "[The Takings Clause] has always been
understood as referring only to a direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting from the exercise
of lawful power. It has never been supposed to have any bearing upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm
and loss to individuals." Id.
46. 123 U.S. 623.
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use without compensating the owner.47 The Court's holding demonstrates how early
takings cases focused on nuisances created by property owners
while disregarding
48
property
the
of
value
the
on
action
government
of
the effect
1.

The Beginning: Mugler v. Kansas and Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon

Mugler v. Kansas is a representative case of the Court's focus on nuisances
created by property owners. The defendant, PeterMugler, was criminally prosecuted
for the violation of the prohibitory liquor law in the state of Kansas.4 9 The Defendant
built a brewery where he manufactured beer.50 On appeal, Mugler argued that the
state statute was unconstitutional and resulted in a taking of his private property. 51
The Court held that although the manufacturer's property was rendered practically
worthless as a result of the regulation,
52 the statute that prohibited the manufacture of
liquor did not amount to a taking. Instead, the Court determined that the regulation
which prohibited the intended use of the property was a valid act of the police power
because it guarded against an evil which threatened to injure the public welfare.53
The Mugler decision and the later case of Hadacheckv. Sebastian,54 established that
a state has a substantial interest in preventing activities similar to public nuisances,
and any such regulation may not require compensation.
Since the issue of diminution in value was not included in the Court's analysis
in Mugler, it was ripe for consideration by the time of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.

47. See id. at 668-69.
48. See Hetzel and Gough, supranote 8, at 225; see also Mugler, 123 U.S. 623 (analyzing restrictions on
a brewery in terms of the damage it may cause to others); see generally Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659
(1878) (permitting restrictions on a fertilizing company in order to protect the health of other citizens in the
vicinity).
49. See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 623.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 624.
52. Id. at 668-69. The Court stated,
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be
injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in anyjust sense, be deemed a taking
or an appropriation of property for the public benefit. Such legislation does not disturb the owner in the
control or use of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but is only a
declaration by the state that its use by any one, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public
interests.
Id.
53. See id. at 66 1-62 (establishing that the police power is properly exercised in prohibiting the manufacture
or sale of intoxicating liquors due to the implications that "excessive use of ardent spirits" has on public health,
morals and safety).
54. 239 U.S. 394 (1915). Petitioner was convicted of a misdemeanor for the violation of a city ordinance
which prohibited any person to operate a brickyard within described city limits. Id. at 404. The Court upheld the
statute stating that to hold differently would "preclude development and fix a city forever in its primitive conditions.
There must be progress, and if in its march private interests are in the way, they must yield to the good of the
community." Id. at 410.
55. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887); see also Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394,
410-11 (1915).
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Mahon.5 6 Pennsylvania Coal concerned the Kohler Act 5 7 which prevented the
Pennsylvania Coal Company from mining under property in such a way as to disturb
the supports located below the surface of the property that homes were built on. 8
The Court announced the general rule that "while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 59 To
determine whether the regulation had gone too far the Court analyzed whether the
law was a valid exercise of police power by balancing the public benefit against the
private loss caused by the statute." The Court found the private loss outweighed the
public benefit and held the regulation was not a taking. 6' By concluding that the
subsidence of a single home did not outweigh the private loss of the Pennsylvania
Coal Company, the Court laid the foundation for a balancing approach to the takings
analysis which was later defined in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York
62
City.

2. A BalancingApproach: Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York

City
Penn Centralintroduced the consideration of the diminution of property value

to the takings analysis. 63 It involved the refusal of the New York City Landmarks
Preservation Commission to approve plans for construction of a fifty-story office
building over the Grand Central Terminal.64 The Penn CentralCourt employed a

56. 260 U.S. 393 (1922); see also Hetzel and Gough, supra note 8, at 226 (discussing how the value of
property was determined to be a relevant factor in a takings analysis which led the Court to add diminution of value
to its balancing approach).
57. See Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 412-13 (discussing the Kohler Act as forbidding the mining of
anthracite coal in a such way as to cause the subsidence of, among other things, any structure used as a human
habitation, with certain exceptions, including among them land where the surface is owned by the owner of the
underlying coal and is distanced more than one hundred and fifty feet from any improved property belonging to any
other person).
58. Id. at 412.
59. Id. at 415.
60. Seeid.at413-14 (balancing the public benefit consisted ofpreventing subsidence ofa single home, while
the private loss consisted of destroying the company's support estate and making its business commercially
impracticable). "For practical purposes, the right to coal consists in the right to mine it. What makes the right to
mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised with profit." Id. at 414.
61. Seeid.at416.
62. 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (holding that New York City's Landmarks Law is not a taking because the
"restrictions imposed [by the regulation] are substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare and,...
permit reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site" while still allowing enhancement of the terminal site).
63. See id. at 130 (discussing that diminution in value in terms of diminished value in the property based
on the use planned by the property owner).
64. See id. at 117-18 (stating that Grand Central Terminal had been designated a "landmark" under New
York's Landmark Preservation Law on August 2, 1967). On January 22, 1968 Penn Central Transportation Co.
entered into a renewable 50-year lease and sub-lease agreement with UGP Properties for Grand Central Terminal.
See id. The appellants then applied for permission to construct an office building on top of the structure and
submitted two separate plans. See id. at 116. Both were rejected. Id. The Commission stated, "[we have] no fixed
rule against making additions to designated buildings-it all depends on how they are done... But to balance a 55-
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three-pronged balancing test to determine whether the implementation of the
Landmarks Preservation Law resulted in a "taking" of the appellant's land.65
The three factors considered by the Court included: "It]he economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant... the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations . . . [and] the character of the
governmental action. 66 In the end, the Court found that "although the regulation
interfered with the property's economic value, it did not prevent a reasonable return
on investment." 67 After Penn Central, when determining whether regulations
constitute a taking, diminution in value was consistently included. 68 Within the
"diminution in value" analysis, the Court looks to the totality of the property interest
at stake. 69 Thus, even if only a portion of the total property is affected by the
"taking," such as the airspace rights in Penn Central,the Court must still engage in
a balancing inquiry based on the totality of the property interest using the Penn
Centralfactors. 70 The Supreme Court soon thereafter shifted toward a more definite
takings principle and a categorical rule.7

story officer tower above a flamboyant Beaux-Arts facade seems nothing more than an aesthetic joke." Id. at 117-18.
65. See id. at 124.
66. Id.
67. Hetzel and Gough, supranote 8, at 226; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 135 (stating that
the owners could not establish a "taking" merely by showing that they had been denied the right to exploit the
superadjacent airspace, irrespective of remainder of the parcel). The law did not interfere with owners' present use
or prevent owner from realizing a reasonable rate of return on his or her investment, especially since preexisting
air rights were transferable to other parcels in the vicinity. Id.
68. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (stating that allowing a State
to eliminate all
economically valuable use of one's land is inconsistent with the Takings Clause).
69. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130-31. The case states that:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine
whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular
governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action
and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole. Id.
70. Robert Freilich, Elizabeth A. Garvin, and Duane A. Martin, Regulatory Takings: FactoringPartial
Deprivationsinto the Taking Equation,in TAKINGs: LAND-DEVELOPMENTCONDITIONS AND REGULATORYTAKINGS
AFTER DOL4N AND LucAs 165, 171 (1996) (citing the Penn Centraltotality rule as the general rule for defining
relevant property). But see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992) (discussing the
Court's avoidance of determining the relevant property to be considered according to the totality rule because of
the "rich tradition of protection at common law" of a fee simple interest in land); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United
States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179 (1994) (using only the 12.5 acres of land to be developed as the deprivation denominator
rather than the entire 51 acres); Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed.C1 21, 31-43 (1999) (challenging
the totality rule generally).
71. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 255 (1980) (discussing a situation where the plaintiffs
claimed a taking after unimproved property they had purchased had been rezoned with density restrictions
preventing their plans to develop the property).
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3. Finally,a Two-Pronged Test: Agins v. City of Tiburon
InAgins v. City of Tiburon,72 the Court announced the general two-pronged test
that remains in use today: 73 a land use regulation does not effect a taking if it
"substantially advances legitimate state interest" and does not "deny an owner
economically viable use of his land." 74 Though this test appears straightforward, its
application created difficulty for the courts.75
The Agins dispute centered around a modified zoning ordinance which placed
the Agins' property in a more restrictive residential planned development and openspace zone.76 The ordinance required property within the zone to be devoted to
single-family dwellings, accessory buildings, and open-space uses. 77 Density
restrictions limited the Agins to building one to five single family residences on
their five-acre tract.78 Instead of applying for a permit from the city to build, the
Agins filed suit in state court alleging a taking of their property. 79 In affirming the
California Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the ordinances did not
constitute a taking. 80 In applying the two pronged balancing test, the Court
concluded Tiburon's open-space ordinances substantially advanced a legitimate
governmental goal, and did not deny the owner economically viable use of his

72.
73.

See id.
Daniel J. Curtain, Jr., Takings in the Land-Use Arena afterLucas and Dolan: How Far IsToo Farin

ImposingExactions?, in TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DoLAN

AND LucAs 83,84 (1996); see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,492-93 (1987)
(holding that the Subsidence Act at issue seeks to further a substantial public interest and fails to show a significant
diminution in value, thus no taking had occurred).
74. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-61. The case also states that:
The determination that governmental action constitutes a taking is, in essence, a determination that the
public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the
public interest. Although no precise rule determines when property has been taken, the question
necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests.
l
75. See generally Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (holding that a
regulation requiring support estates to be left in the ground when mining coal promoted a substantial public interest
and did not effect a substantial diminution in value); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)
(holding that conditioning a building permit on the obtainment of an easement across private property is not a valid
regulation of land use); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding that when all
economically beneficial use is taken from an individual's property, a taking has occurred); Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374 (1994) (determining that the desire to improve conditions for the public is not enough to prevent a
taking to be found).
76. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 257 (citing Tiburon, Cal., Ordinances Nos. 123 & 124 N.S. (June 28, 1973)).
77. See id.
78. See id. (noting that appellants never sought approval for development of their land under the zoning
ordinances because shortly after the ordinances were enacted the city began eminent domain proceedings against
appellants's land).
79. See id. (seeking $2 million in damages for inverse condemnation-the manner in which a landowner
recovers just compensation for a taking of his property when condemnation proceedings have not been
instituted-and requesting a declaration that the zoning ordinances were facially unconstitutional).
80. See id. at 262 (noting that "[a]lthough the ordinances limit development, they neither prevent the best
use of appellants' land, nor extinguish a fundamental attribute of ownership").
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both Agins and Penn Central are an integral part of the takings
land.81 Today,
82
analysis.
C. PresentDay Takings
In Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastalCommission,83 more than fifteen years after
Penn Central,the Court reiterated the use of balancing factual inquiries in order to
determine whether a taking has occurred. 84 However, in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council,the Court recognized two instances in which the judiciary is not
required to partake in a balancing of the Penn Central factors, which results in
finding a taking as a matter of law. 5 The first instance occurs when a regulation
compels a property owner to suffer a physical invasion of his property.86 The second
categorical rule, which was at issue in Lucas, involves regulation that "denies a
[property owner] all economically beneficial or productive use [of his land]. '
These categorical rules have led to, what the Court refers to as, per se takings.
1.

Per se Takings

The case of Loretto v. TeleprompterManhattan CATV Corp. recognized for the
first time that a per se taking occurs when the character of the governmental action
is a permanent physical occupation of a landowners property.8 8 In Loretto, appellees

81. See id.at 261-62 (recognizing that the governmental goal was to discourage premature and unnecessary
conversion of open-space land to urban uses).
82. See generally Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). Some scholars
argue that the Penn Central factors and the Agins two-pronged test are the same. Agins has merely taken the
economic impact of the regulation and a land owners investment backed expectations and combined them into one:
a land use regulation does not deny the landowner economically viable use of his land. Interview with Raymond
R. Coletta, Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, in Sacramento, California
(February 14,2001).
83. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006-09 (1992) (determining whether South
Carolina's Beachfront Management Act implemented a taking of David Lucas' land). Lucas had purchased
undeveloped coastal property on the Isle of Palms in order to build single-family residences. Id. at 1008. The Act
restricted the use of Lucas' property, thus not allowing him to build his single family homes. Id.
84. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 (recognizing the takings analysis as a balancing test by stating "the Fifth
Amendment is violated when land-use regulation 'does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies
an owner economically viable use of his land"'); see also Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
85. See Lucas,505 U.S. at 1015 (noting there are two categories ofregulatory action which are compensable
without a case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the governmental action).
86. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (requiring compensation for
a governmental regulation which allowed cable companies to place cables and cable boxes on an apartment
building); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (referring to Loretto as the illustrative case for per se takings where
governmental action has physically invaded a landowners property).
87. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (developing a categorical rule for permanent physical deprivations of all
economic use of the relevant property by likening the loss of value to the physical loss of the property).
88. See Loretto, 458 U.S. 419 (1982). "Weconclude that a permanent physical occupation authorized by
government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve." Id. at 426.
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Teleprompter Corporation and Teleprompter Manhattan CATV received permission
from the previous owner of Loretto's five story apartment building to install a cable
and cable box on the building. 89 Initially, the cable lines installed on Loretto's
building did not service his tenants. 90 Two years after Loretto bought the building,
Teleprompter began providing CATV service to the building's tenants by dropping
a cable line down the front of the building to the first floor.9 On January 1, 1973,
New York enacted the New York Executive Law which provided that a landlord
may not "interfere with the installation of cable television facilities upon his
property or premises. 92 Loretto filed suit in 1976 alleging Teleprompters
installation was a trespass and that section 828 of the New York Executive Law was
a taking without just compensation. 93
The Supreme Court held that a permanent physical occupation authorized by the
government was a per se taking, even though the physical and economic interference
with the landowner's property was minimal.94 The Court further stated when a per
se taking was found, a balancing of interests was not required. 95 If a permanent
physical invasion has not occurred, then the Court must undertake an ad hoc,
multifactor inquiry into the "economic impact of the regulation, the extent to which
it interferes with investment backed expectations, and the character of the
government action. 96 Thus, if a per se taking is not found, finding a taking will
depend on the result generated from a balancing of the Penn Centralfactors.97
Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastalCouncilannounced the second situation where
a categorical rule is appropriate.98 In Lucas, the Court stated a per se taking occurs
"when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property
economically idle." 99 Lucas involved the purchase of two residential lots on the Isle

89. See id. at 422 (describing the box as the size of a bread box and the cable lines as running down the front
of the owners building).
90. See id.
91. See id. (stating that "CATV" is an abbreviation for "cable television").
92. Id. at 423 (stating that section 828 of the New York Executive Law provided that a landlord could not
interfere with installation of cable on the premises and could not demand payment from a tenant or CATV in any
amount in excess of what the State Commission on Cable Television determines to be reasonable).
93. See id. at 424.
94. See id.
95. See id. ("[A] permanent physical occupation authorized by the government is a taking without regard
to the public interests that it may serve").
96. Id. (citations omitted).
97. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-131; see also Daniel R. Mandelker,
Investment BackedExpectationsin Takings Law, in TAKINGS: LAND-DEvELOPmENTCoNDITIONS AND REGULATORY
TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND LUCAS 119, 126 (1996) ("When a per se taking does not occur, the Penn Central
balancing test applies").
98. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (citing Agins, 447 U.S. at 260;
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834; Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495; Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc.,
452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981)).
99. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
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of Palms to be used for single-family homes."" In 1988, the South Carolina
Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act, which barred Lucas, the
petitioner, from erecting any permanent habitable structures on his two parcels
because they were located in a "critical area."' 0' Lucas filed suit in the South
Carolina Court of Common Pleas, arguing that the legislation effected a taking of
his property without just compensation.102
A state trial court found that the legislation rendered Lucas' parcels valueless. 0 3
The Supreme Court held that a per se taking occurs, absent a common law nuisance,
when a landowner is denied all economically beneficial use of his land, "regardless
of the governmental interest supporting the legislation."' 4 Thus, like in Loretto,
once a per se taking has been found the Court's inquiry ceases without a balancing
of interest as outlined in Penn Central.
Some scholars believe the Lucas decision illustrated three key points. First, in
order for the Lucas rule to apply, a landowner must be deprived of all economically
beneficial use of the property. 10 5 If the Lucas per se rule does not apply, the court
must analyze the governmental action under a balancing of the Penn Central
factors.it 6 Finally, regardless of whether the court must balance the Penn Central
factors or apply the Lucas per se rule, the court must determine whether the property
should be looked at in its entirety or by focusing on the part of the parcel that is
being taken.10 7
2. Determinationof the Unit of Property to be Evaluated
After the Court determined in Lucas that governmental action which leaves a
parcel valueless constitutes a per se taking, the analytical focus shifted to defining
the specific unit of property.108 Traditionally, even if only a portion of the total

100. See id. at 1006-07. At the time that Lucas purchased the lots they did not qualify as being in a "critical
area." Id. at 1008.
101. See id. at 1007 (citing Beachfront Management Act, S.C.Code Ann. § 48-39-250 et. seq. (Supp. 1990)).
Under the Act a "critical area" was defined to include beaches and immediately adjacent sand dunes. Id.
102. See id. at 1009.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 1015; see also G. Richard Hill, PartialTakings after Dolan, in TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT
CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFrER DouiN AND LUCAS 189, 194 (1996).
105. See Freilich, supranote 70, at 171.
106. See id.; see also Lucas,505 U.S. at 1019 n.8.; see also Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d
1171, 1179 (1994) (applying the PennCentralfactors to the prohibition of construction on wetlands); Florida Rock
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl 21, 31-43 (1999) (applying the Penn Central balancing test to the
disturbance of wetlands and the mining of subsurface minerals).
107. See Freilich, supra note 70, at 171.
108. See Raymond R. Coletta, The Measuring Stick of Regulatory Takings: A Biological and Cultural
Analysis, 1 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 20,21-22 (1998) (discussing the relevant property for the determination of economic
impact in a takings analysis by looking to both the horizontal and vertical dimension of property).
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property has been taken, when the Court began its balancing under the Penn Central
factors, the unit of property being scrutinized was the total parcel: 109
'[T]aking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment
have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental
action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character
of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in
the parcelas a whole ....
11
After the totality rule was defined in Penn Central, determining the economic
impact on a landowners property was done by looking
at the parcel as a whole."
112
However, the Lucas case challenged the totality rule.
In Lucas, Justice Scalia pointed out that it was unclear whether the Court should
analyze a situation where a property owner loses a large percent of their property as
the owner having "been deprived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened
portion of the tract,or whether the owner suffered a mere diminution in value of the
tract as a whole."' 3 In the end, although Justice Scalia challenged "the utility of the
totality rule," he refrained from announcing a new definition of the relevant mass
of property to be considered. 4 Thus, the Court restated that "when the owner of real
property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically
beneficial uses in the
' 5
name of the common good.., he has suffered a taking.""1

109. See Freilich, supra note 70, at 172.
110. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (emphasis supplied).
111. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBedictus, 480 U.S. 470,497 (1986) (citing Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. 51 (1979), the Court stated, "where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction
of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety); see also Coletta,
supranote 108, at 44 (stating, "there could be no doubt that by firmly cementing the principle of nonsegmentation
in Keystone, the Supreme Court acknowledged nonsegmentation as the law of the land").
112. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7 (stating Justice Scalia's questioning of the traditional view recognizing
that "deprivation of all economically feasible use" is an imprecise test for takings because it "does not make clear
the 'property interest' against which the loss of value is to be measured"); see generally Florida Rock Indus., Inc.
v. United States, 45 Fed.C1. 21 (1999) (postulating that the Fifth Amendment prohibits the uncompensated taking
of private property without reference to the owner's remaining property interests). In FloridaRock, the Federal
Circuit concluded that "a taking occurs when the government deprives the owner of a substantial part, but not
essentially all, of the economic use or value of the property." Michael M. Berger, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council: Yes, Wzrginia There Can be Partial Takings, in TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND
REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLN AND LUCAS 148, 154 (1996).

113. Freilich, supranote 70, at 172; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7 (emphasis supplied).
114. Freilich, supranote 70,at 172 (discussing flaws in Justice Scalia's approach, such as: the ability of a
court to divide the property into segments and then treat one single segment as the entire property, the implications
of defining relevant property as less than the whole, and finally allowing Justice Scalia's view to prevail property
owners to strategically parcel their property to ensure the finding of a taking); see also Coletta, supra note 108, at
61-62.
115. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. The Court addresses, in a footnote, Justice Stevens disagreement with the
requirement that all economically beneficial use be lost. Id. at 1019 n.8; see also Coletta, supranote 108, at 35-66
(arguing that although there have been a few cases which have tried to disturb the totality rule, when determining
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Even though Justice Scalia did not abandon the use of the totality rule to
determine the unit of property to be measured, lower courts became confused as to
the proper standard to apply. Due to this confusion,' 6 the Court clarified its
definition of the totality rule in Concrete Pipe and Products of California v.
Construction Laborers Pension Trustfor Southern California.1 7 Concrete Pipe's
takings challenge centered around the idea that legislative regulations enacted after
a contract was made could not effect that contractual agreement."18 Concrete Pipe
also claimed that by allowing the regulation to retroactively apply to their contract,
a taking would result.' 19 The Court reviewed Concrete Pipe's claim under the Penn
Centralfactors, rejecting a Lucas per se claim.120 In evaluating the economic impact,
the Court explicitly rejected Concrete Pipe's attempt to segment the property, 2 1
stating:
We rejected this analysis years ago in Penn CentralTransportationCo. v.
New York City, where we held that a claimant's parcel of property could not
first be divided into what was taken and what was left for the purpose of
demonstrating the taking of the former to be complete and hence
compensable. To the extent that any portion of the property is taken, that
portion is always taken in its entirety; the relevant question, however, is
whether the property taken is all, or only a portion of, the parcel in
question. 22
Therefore, when the Lucas per se rule does not apply, because the owner has not
been deprived of all use and value when viewed in light of the entire property, the
court analyzes the governmental action under the ad hoc, factual inquiry delineated
by Penn Centralwhile looking at the property in its entirety.' 23 Hence, although the
whether a taking has occurred courts still look to the relevant parcel as being the parcel as a whole).
116. See Freilich,supranote 70, at 173 (stating "unfortunately, Justice Scalia's questioning ofthe totality rule
in Lucas has led to considerable confusion about the proper definition of the deprivation denominator").
117. Concrete Pipe and Products of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602 (1993)
(reaffirming the totality rule and the essence of its holdings in Penn Centraland Keystone).
118. See Freilich, supranote 70, at 174.
119. See id.
120. See ConcretePipe,508 U.S. at 643- 44 (stating that Concrete Pipe is trying to "shoehorn its claim into"
a Lucas analysis of destruction of all economically beneficial use of real property).
121. See id. at 643-45 (recognizing that in evaluating the economic impact, the relevant property is the
property as a whole).
122. Id. (citing Keystone, 490 U.S. at 497, "Our test for regulatory taking requires us to compare the value
that remains in the property, and one of the critical questions is determining how to define the unit of property
'whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction"') (citation omitted).
123. See Hetzel and Gough, supranote 8, at 228 (stating that more importantly, the categorical rule laid out
in Lucas the Court's "acceptance of a balancing test for those cases that do not fall within the purview of [the]
categorical rule"); see also Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (stating the Penn Centralfactors as: the character of the
governmental action, the economic impact on the property owner resulting from a loss of all reasonable use of value
in the entirety of the property, and the regulation's interference with the property owner's investment backed
expectations).
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takings analysis in the United States has been reviewed and addressed in multiple
cases since Penn Central,the balancing test
remains the preferred analytical tool to
24
determine whether a taking has occurred.1
III. GERMAN EXPROPRIATION

Similar to the United States, Germany's recognition of an individuals right to
property traces back to its Basic Law.l2- Although both countries juxtapose the right
to property with the right for governmental interference if compensation is paid,
Germany adds social obligation as a limit on an individuals property rights.12 6 This
explicit difference in the two constitutions lays the foundation for the similarities
and the differences between United States and German takings jurisprudence. In
order to understand these comparisons, one must understand the background of
German expropriation. 2 7
A. Backgroundof Property Rights in Europe
Generally, due to the recognition that an individual is merely one part of a larger
community, European constitutions focus on the social function of private property
when defining a person's property rights.128 By placing the social function of
property within their constitutions, constitutional status is given to society's right
12 9
to regulate property without requiring the payment of compensation of the owner.
However, European constitutions attempt to balance individual rights to be free from
government intrusions with community rights to regulate property for the common
good.1 30 Due to the fact that many European constitutions explicitly declare the

124. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); see also Loveladies Harbor v.
United States, 28 F3d 1171 (1994); Florida Rock Indust., Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21 (1999)
125. See Grundegesetz art. 14 (F.R.G.); see also infra note 153.
126. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Grundegesetz art. 14 (F.R.G.).
127. Expropriation is "a governmental taking or modification of an individual's property rights, especially
by eminent domain." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 602 (7th ed. 1999).
128. See GLENDoN, RIGHTS TALK, supranote 2, at 32-40 (addressing the influence of Rousseau on European
constitutions and Locke's influence on the United States). "Rousseau wrote that property rights are always
subordinate to the overriding claims of the community; that an owner is a king of trustee or steward for the public
good .
Id.
L...
at 34.
129. See Otto Kimminich, PropertyRights, in RIGHTS, INsTrrUTIONS AND IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
ACCORDING TO THE GERMAN BASIC LAW 75, 85-86 (Christian Starck ed., 1987) (explaining that the social

obligation on property "creates legal obligations of the owner concerning the use of his property").
130. See Joseph H.H. Weiler, EurocracyandDistrust:Some QuestionsConcerningthe Role oftthe European
Court of Justice in the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights within the Legal Order of the European

Communities,61 WASH.L. REV.1103,1128 (1986) (discussing property rightsjurisprudence ofthe European Court
of Justice).
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creation of welfare states, 131 the government must balance giving to those who are
in need without intruding on the rights of other individuals.132
1. HistoricalInfluences on the Right of Property in German Constitutional
Law
European political theory was influenced heavily by the writings of JeanJacques Rousseau. 133 European constitutions have been significantly shaped by
Rousseau's refusal to place individual claims to possessive rights above societal
claims to promote the public good. 134 Accordingly, Rousseau was willing to make
individual property rights secondary to a community right to regulate for the
common good. 35 The influences of these notions are seen in the German
Constitution's attempt to define property in terms of its social function.136 "By
defining and, at the same time restraining, individual rights, collectivity, and
individuality are counter-posed and balanced against one another in the Basic

131. See Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions,59 U.CHI. L. REv. 519, 527-32
(1992) [hereinafter Glendon, Rights] (defining welfare state as an entitlement to individuals to call upon the
government to affirmatively achieve social justice through necessary level of wealth redistribution).
132. See Gunter Durig, An Introduction to the Basic Law of the FederalRepublic of Germany, in TIE
CONSTITUTION OFTHEFEDERALREPUBLIC OFGERMANY 11,20 (Ulrich Karpen ed., 1988); see also Glendon, Rights,
supranote 131, at 526-32 (discussing the concept of a welfare state in Europe).
133. See Durig, supra note 132, at 32. "Rousseau's writings evidenced a suspicion and distrust toward
unmitigated pursuit of private property." Michael R. Antinori, Does Lochner Live in Luxembourg?: An Analysis
of the PropertyRights Jurisprudenceof the EuropeanCourt of Justice, 18 FORDHAMINT'LL.J. 1778, 1786 (1995)
(contrasting the U.S. property rights ideology based on John Locke with the European political theory of JeanJacques Rousseau); see also RoussEAu, DiscouRsE ON INEQUALITY 55 (1984). Rousseau states that:
The first man who, having enclosed a piece of land, thought of saying, 'This is mine', and came across
people simple enough to believe him. How many crimes, wars, murders, and how much misery and
horror the human race might have been spared if someone had pulled up the stakes or filled in the ditch,
and cried out to his fellows: 'Beware of listening to this charlatan. You are lost if you forget that the
fruits of the earth belong to all and that the earth itself belongs to no one!'
134. See GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, supranote 2, at 32-40.
135. See id. at 34.
136. See Grundgesetz art. 14(2) (F.R.G.); see also Antinori, supranote 133, at 1789 (stating "the catalogue
of individual rights in the German Constitution ("Basic Rights") reflects a balance of individual rights and
community interests").
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Law."137 Hence, the German Constitution's explicit recognition 38
of the social element
of property tempers its individual property rights guarantees.1
2. BalancingRechstaat and Sozialstaat
Germany balances its need for individual property rights and the importance of
society's property rights in two separate ideologies. The German Constitution's
commitment to safeguarding individual property rights is rooted in the Rechstaat.'3 9
The Rechstaatwas designed to be the way a state functioned, not the actual form of
state or form of the state's government. 140 A "state of reason" where the government41
looks to the collective will to determine what would be best, and then pursues it.'
"One of the central promises of Rechstaat is freedom from state imposed
interferences with individual property rights. 1 42 Three elements of the Rechstaat
enable Germany to fulfill this promise.' 43 First is the rejection of the state as
something divinely ordained along with the recognition that a state exists for the
benefit of each individual. 144 The second element sets forth the importance of
"safeguarding and individual liberty and facilitating individual self-fulfillment.' ' 145

137. Antinori, supra note 133, at 1789. The Basic Law entered into force on May 23, 1949 and was termed
the "basic law" because the "Parliamentary Council did not want to bestow the dignified term 'constitution' on a
document drafted to govern part of Germany for a transitional period that would only last until national
reunification." DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

GERMANY 35 (1989). It was later decided that the Basic Law would be retained as an all-German constitution, with
a continued designation as the Grundgesetz. See id. at 30. When the Basic Law was drafted, the German people
attempted to "avoid the deficiencies of earlier constitutions and create a government based on human dignity and
human rights." Klaus Stem, GeneralAssessment of the Basic Law--A German Viev, in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC
LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FuTuRE-A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOsIuM 17, 19 (Paul Kirchhof and Donald P.
Kommers eds., 1989).
138. See GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, supranote 2, at 40 (establishing that individual rights were commingled
with social responsibility); see also ERNST-WOLFGANGBOCKENFORDE, The OriginandDevelopment ofthe Concept
of the Rechstaat, in STATE, SOCIETY AND LIBERTY: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 48
(1990) (describing the Rechstaatas a product "which arose out of the constitutional thought of early liberalism in
Germany"); see also KOMMERS, supra note 137, at 35 (stating that the Sozialstaatis regarded as "an important
ingredient of Germany's constitutional tradition"). Both the Rechstaat and the Sozialstaat are considered
conceptions of the social state which receive authoritative status. Id.
139. See BOCKENFORDE, supranote 138, at 47-48 (explaining that Rech means law and Staat means state).
The Rechstaatis described as a state governed by reason; a state which realizes that human coexistence depends
on the law of reason. See id. at 49; see also GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, supranote 2, at 39. Article 14 of the German
Basic Law provides: "Property and the right of inheritance are guaranteed." Grundgesetz art. 14(1) (F.R.G.).
140. See BOCKENFORDE, supranote 134, at 49.
141. See id. (citing Von Aretin, Staatsrechtder konstitutionellenMonarchie, vol. 1, p. 163).
142. Antinori, supranote 133, at 1790 (discussing the development of the German rule of law as working to
provide a limit on the exercise of state in order to protect the individual from the state).
143. See BOCKENFORDE, supra note 138, at 49-50 (recognizing that the Rechstaat mirrors the work of
Immanuel Kant).
144. See id. at49 (defining a 'body politic,' respublica)."The starting-point and point of reference for the
political order is the free, equal, self-determined individual and his earthly aims in life .... "Id.
145. Il "Restriction of the objects and functions of the state to the liberty and security of the person and of
property .... Id.
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The final element provides for a recognition of fundamental civil rights and a
reliable administration of justice. 146 The Rechstaatthen forms a state that insists on
"freedom, equality, and autonomy of each individual" under a unified legal order.147
In addition to a tradition protecting the individual from interference by the state,8
14
Germany protects society's right to property in a second ideology, the Sozialstaat.
"Sozialstaat,calls for a state that will look after its citizens and distribute wealth to
those in need; a state that will actively intervene in market and social orders to
counter inequality of conditions."1 49 The Sozialstaat, and its commitment to an
active state, grew out of the belief that public authorities needed to restore a
meaningful level of individual freedom50 before the guarantees of the Rechstaat
became empty promises to the citizens.1
These two ideals, as the basis for German constitutional order, seem to provide
unavoidable incoherence.15 '
Rechstaat is bound up with direct and absolute guarantees of individual
freedom from intervening government measures as a matter of
constitutional right. Equally direct, absolute guarantees of Sozialstaatto
active state assistance are not possible as a matter of constitutional right
without dismantling the guarantees provided for by Rechstaat.For example,
it is difficult to commit the constitutional order to directly enforceable rights
to redistribute state action. To give some necessarily entails taking
from
l52
others, and the two principles logically cancel each other out.
The Rechstaat differs from the Sozialstaat because the promise of guaranteed
153
individual property rights is explicitly defined in Article 14 of the Basic Law.

146. See id. at 50 (listing fundamental civil rights as civil liberty, equality before the law, and the guarantee
of acquired property).
147. See KOM mRs, supranote 137, at 36; see also BOCKENFORDE, supra note 138, at 69 (concluding "the
Rechstaat always seeks to limit and contain the power and supremacy of the state in the interests of individual
liberty").
148. See KOMmERS, supra note 137, at 35 (explaining that the Sozialstaat stands for social justice and
obligates the government to provide for the basic needs of all Germans).
149. Antinori, supra note 133, at 1790 (stating that the Sozialstaat is a recognition that the state may act as
a friend or an enemy to personal freedom).
150. See id. (discussing the perception that "freedom may be restricted not only by the state but also through
factual circumstances").
151. BOCKENFORDE, supranote 138, at 61-62 (discussing the disagreement of how the social element of the
Sozialstaatmay be incorporated into the constitutional framework of the Rechstaat).
152. Antinori, supra note 133, at 1791 (discussing the tension between the Rechstaat and the Sozialstaat).
153. Grundgesetz art. 14 (F.R.G.). Article 14 provides:
1) Property and the rights of inheritance are guaranteed. Their content and limits shall be determined
by the laws.
2) Property imposes duties. Its use should also serve the public weal.
3) Expropriation shall be permitted only in the public weal. It may be effected only by or pursuant
to a law which shall provide for the nature and extent of compensation. Such compensation shall
be determined by establishing an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests

20011 Propertyas a FundamentalRight in the UnitedStates and Germany
Alleviation of social inequalities is not an individual right delineated in the Basic
Law, therefore the legislature is left to define its substance. 154 To resolve the tension
55
between these two traditions, a balancing of the principles behind them is done.1
Although the right to individual property is guaranteed in the Basic Law, the
right is explicitly limited in the language of Article 14.156 First, Article 14(1)
establishes the state's power to define the content and limits of property. 57 Further,
Article 14(2) contends that the ownership of property imposes individual duties and
responsibilities to society. 58 Article 14 recognizes property functioning as both an
individual right and as a benefit of society.159 Therefore, Article 14 encompasses the
dual functions of property found in the Rechstaatand Sozialstaatand supports both
as equally important constitutional values.' 6
The combination of the right to individual property and the duties imposed in
Article 14, provides
a framework under which the legislature may pursue the
61
Sozialstaat.1
Limitations on individual rights provide sufficient berth for the legislature
to pursue economic policies designed to achieve social justice. The
legislature, in pursuing social justice as an economic policy, can activate the
social function of property by calling upon the individual's duties to use
their property in a manner that serves the common good. The values
embodied in Sozialstaat become a justification to support legislation that
allegedly interferes with individual property rights. At the same time, the
legislature must respect individual rights. 162
The promotion of a state that interferes in social orders to counter inequality among
its citizens has found a balance through the framework of Article 14 in the Basic

of those affected. In case of dispute regarding the amount of compensation, recourse may be had
to the ordinary courts.
Id.; see also KOMMERS, supranote 137, at 241 (establishing that the Basic Law is "largely silent with regard to the
nature of social rights").
154. See KOMMERS, supranote 137, at 34-39; see also BOCKENFORDE, supra note 138, at 63-64.
155. See KOMMMRS, supra note 137, at 34-39 (defining Sozialstaat to mean "social welfare state" and
Rechstaat to mean "state based on the rule of law").
156. See Grundgesetz art. 14 (F.R.G.).
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See Antinori, supranote 133, at 1793 (discussing the recognition and balancing of an interference by
the state for the benefit of its citizens with an individuals right to property in Article 14).
160. See Gunnar Folke Schuppert, The Right to Property,in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY 107, 108-11 (Ulrich Karpen ed., 1988) (explaining the dual functions of property in terms of a
personal function, which serves as a safeguard for the freedom of the individual, and a social function, where the
use of property should serve the public welfare).
161. See id.; see also Antinori, supranote 133, at 1793.
162. Antinori, supranote 133, at 1793; see also Kimminich, supranote 129, at 86 (discussing the difference
between expropriation and the social obligation of property); see also KOMMERS, supranote 137, at 251 (describing
the limitations placed on individual property rights).
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Law, the ideals of the Rechstaat,the protection of individual property fights, and the
Sozialstaat.163 The balance of the Rechstaat and Sozialstaat has been further
interpreted by the German Courts.
3. Gennan Courts
The German judiciary is divided into three court systems: the Federal
Constitutional Court, the federal courts, and the courts of Lander.' 14 In addition,
there are administrative, labor, social, and finance courts.165 The Federal
Constitutional Court is the only court in Germany with jurisdiction over
constitutional questions.166 Therefore, anyone claiming his constitutional property
rights have been violated may file a complaint directly with the Federal
Constitutional Court.' 67 Another German Court, the Federal Supreme Court, is the
Germany's highest court for matters of general jurisdiction.1 68 It receives claims
outside the scope of the special courts.169 "Ordinarily only one set of courts in
Germany has jurisdiction over a give subject area of the law."' 170 However, questions
regarding property law have been divided between the administrative and ordinary
courts.' 7 ' Thus, a case dealing with property rights may be decided in any of the
German Courts. 172

163. See KOMMNES, supranote 137, at 241-42. The Rechstaatand Sozialstaatthen join together under the
Basic Law. Id.The Rechstaat, protects the individual from the state and the Sozialstaat obligates the state to
construct a just social order. Id.
164. See DAviD P. CURRIE, THE CONsTrrunoN OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 25-30 (1994).
165. See id. at 150.
166. See Timothy L. Gartin,Parityand the Litigation ofPrivatePropertyRights in the Statesand Germany:
Evidence in Support of Chemerinsky's Litigant Choice Principle, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 747,771 (1995).
167. See CURRIE, supra note 164, at 27.
168. See Gartin,supranote 166, at 772 (noting that the five special courts cover patent, administrative, tax,
labor, and social insurance law).
169. See id.
170. KOMMERS, supra note 137, at 253 n.34.
171. See id. (discussing how the administrative courts have the authority to decide whether property has been
taken and the ordinary courts must decide the amount of compensation). Due to the fact that the issue of a taking
and the right to compensation overlap, both courts have been required to define a "public good" and a "compensable
taking." Id.
172. See id. (stating that this results in the implementation of different doctrines to determine when a taking
will be found); see also Schuppert, supranote 160, at 114.
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4. Article 14 of the Basic Law
The three clauses of Article 14, the contents and limits clause, 73 the social
function clause, 74 and the individual rights clause, 7 5 have been harmonized by the
German Federal Constitutional Court ("German Court") through the institution of
judicial review.t 76Without intervention of the German Court, the contents and limits
clause grants the legislature the discretion to regulate private property without
limitation. 177 However, the German Court limits the legislative power under Article
14 by requiring it to harmonize the dual functions of property. "In regulating
property, the legislature must adhere to the constitutional principle that property
should serve the common good and must pursue economic policies designed to
achieve social justice. In addition, the legislature must regulate property with due
respect for 78the constitutional value of autonomy underlying individual
ownership."1
By defining property according to both the individual and social functions of
property recognized by the Basic Law, the German Court can monitor whether the
legislature is adequately balancing the competing values of individual property
rights. 179 Different gradations of protection are then applied according to the type of
property at issue.180 Whether property serves a more individual or a8 more social
function helps categorize the different types of proprietary interests.'1
The core of an individual's constitutionally protected property rights in
Germany are formed according to types of property that contribute to ensuring
personal freedom, such as one's dwelling.18 2 The outer limits of an individual's
constitutionally protected property rights are formed by the types of property that
serve important social purposes, such as corporate stock. 8 3 Legislation which

173. Grundgesetz art. 14(1) (F.R.G.). "Property's content and limits shall be determined by the laws." Id.
174. See id. at art. 14(2). ("Property imposes duties. Its use should also serve the public weal").
175. See id. at art 14(1). ("Property and the rights of inheritance are guaranteed").
176. See KOMMERS, supranote 137, at 241-42,250. The social function clause has been discussed under the
guise of the Sozialstaat. Id. at 34-37. The individual's rights clause has also been discussed according to the
tradition oftheRechstaat.See id.Because the Federal Constitutional Court has priority over constitutional questions
the discussion of Article 14 relies on the Constitutional Courts findings. See id.
177. See id. at 256.
178. Antinori, supra note 133, at 1794-95; see also Schuppert, supra note 160, at 114 (hypothesizing that the
legislature will only be successful at harmonizing the two constitutional demands of property if it combines both
functions in a proportional way).
179. See KOMMERS, supra note 137, at 264; see also Mary Ann Glendon, Comment on Part4, in GERMANY
& ITS BASIc LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE-A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 283, 283 (Paul Kirchof &

Donald P. Kommers eds., 1989) [hereinafter Glendon, Comment] (comparing individual property rights in the
United States with property rights in Germany).
180. See Glendon, Comment, supranote 179, at 285 (proclaiming that the legislature may define the contents
and limits of ownership rights in shares of stock differently than a person's ownership rights for their dwelling
place).

181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id.
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interferes with core constitutionally protected property rights is subject to strict
constitutional review.1 l

4

The German Court requires a greater degree of justification for legislation
that touches the core of an individual's property right. With regard to types
of property that serve a distinctively social function, however, the
legislature's duty to the public outweighs its duty to the individual. Under
the German Court's methodology, the existing private law is not of
determinative import in defining the constitutionally protected property
rights of an individual. Individuals do not necessarily have a
constitutionally protected property
right in the proprietary interests that they
85
law.
private
the
under
claim
Hence, an individual's
constitutionally protected right to property depends on the
186

property's function.

B. The Introductionof the EuropeanCourt of Justice and the European
Community
Constitutional traditions and practices of the European Community Member
States as well as the provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention), lay the foundation for
European constitutional theory pertaining to individual property rights.8 7 If the ECJ
is given the power to review Member States' legislation, economic policy decisionmaking powers could be shifted from the Member States to the ECJ.188 The

184. See id.; see also Schuppert, supranote 160, at 114-15. "Thus, the more a particular type of proprietary
interest serves an individual function, and, thus, the closer it is to the core of the individual's constitutionally
protected property rights, the greater the legislature's duty to the individual." Antinori, supra note 133, at 1795.
185. Antinori, supra note 133, at 1795-96; see also Schuppert, supra note 160, at 114-115; see also
KOMMERS, supranote 137, at 265. Kommers, quoting the German Constitutional Court, notes:
The concept of property as guaranteed by the Constitution must be derived from the Constitution itself.
This concept of property in the constitutional sense cannot be derived from legal norms (ordinary
statutes) lower in rank than the Constitution, nor can the scope of concrete property guarantee be
determined on the basis of private law regulation.
Id.
186. See KOMMERS, supra note 137; at 253-54 (addressing the Parlimentary Council's earlier draft of the
Basic Law which discussed the social obligation of property as entailing limits found in the living necessities of all
citizens and the public order essential to society).
187. See GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, supranote 2, at 32-40; see also European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://conventions.
coe.int/treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm [hereinafter European Convention] (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer); see also Protocol No. I to the European Convention, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter
Protocol No. 1] (copy on file with The TransnationalLawyer) (Germany signed the Convention on April 11, 1950).
188. See Antinori,supranote 133, at 1783. German expropriation would be effected because the ECJ would
have the final say on whether a taking had occurred. l
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implementation of the ECJ should give citizens of Member States added protection
from possible violations of fundamental rights. 8 9
1. The Difference Between European ConstitutionalTheory and the U.S.
Constitution
European constitutional theory concerning individual property rights is different
from that of the United States in two respects.' 90 First, European constitutional
theory gives the societal right to regulate property equal priority with an individuals
right to property. 9 "Conversely, the U.S. Constitution only recognizes the
individual's right to property, and the societal right to regulate private property is
a judicially imposed limit on an otherwise absolute individual right."' 92 Second, in
Europe, property rights encompass both an anti-redistributive principle and a
distributive principle, including a positive right to claims upon the government for
subsistence.1 93 Individual property rights in the United States function as an antiredistributive principle consisting of "negative" rights to be free from government
interference.1 94
2. Creationof FundamentalRights in the European Community
The ECJ references two sources in defining fundamental rights norms. 95 The
ECJ draws on the constitutional traditions of the Member States as well as on
international human rights treaties collaborated by the Member States. 9 6 The ECJ
incorporates common constitutional tradition and other applicable provisions from
human rights treaties into the Community Legal Order. 197 Therefore, the ECJ

189. See id. (discussing the promise of the ECJ to review Community legislation in order to prevent violations
of fundamental rights).
190. See GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, supra note 2, at 32-40; Glendon, Comment, supra note 179, at 285;
Glendon, Rights, supra note 131, at 519.
191. See Weiler, supra note 130, at 1128; see also Antinori, supra note 133, at 1781.
192. Antinori, supranote 133, at 178 1; see alsoU.S. CONST. amend.XIV (stating "nor shall any State deprive
any person of... property without due process of law"); U.S. CONST. amend. V (declaring "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, withoutjust compensation"); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413
("As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power").
193. See David P. Currie, Positive andNegative ConstitutionalRights, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 864,867-68 (1986)
(contrasting the U.S. Constitution's negative liberties against European Constitution's positive rights).
194. See Jackson v. City of Joilet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir,), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1983).
[The U.S. Constitution] is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties .... The men who wrote
the Bill of Rights were not concerned that Government might do too little for the people but that it might
do too much to them. The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868 in the height of laissez-faire
thinking, sought to protect Americans from oppression by state government, not to secure them basic
government services.
Id.
195. Weiler, supra note 130, at 1125-29.
196. See id.
197. See id.
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protects fundamental rights according to a judge-made bill of rights, made by
Member States, that functions as Community Law.
The ECJ also draws upon the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.' 98 The Convention uses common principles of
the signatory states to codify fundamental rights. 199 However, due to differences
regarding the inclusion of property rights, the majority of delegates agreed that the
Convention should focus on the social function of ownership rather than an
individual's personal property interest.200 A Committee of Experts drafted the
protocol guaranteeing the right to property, interpreted to encompass three distinct
rules. 20 ' First, the Protocol establishes the general principle of peaceful enjoyment
of property.20 2 The next rule covers deprivations of property, and subjects them to
conditions provided for by international law.203 Finally, the third rule recognizes that
Contracting States are entitled to enact laws the state deems necessary to control the
use of property for the general good.2 4
After examination of the Protocol and the constitutional traditions of the
Member States, the delegates concluded that the three rules of the Protocol reflected
the general tendencies of the Member States and thus, should be included into the
Community Legal Order. 205 With this foundation, the ECJ developed the basis of its
"takings" analysis. The threshold question is whether to classify the limitation
(regulation) as an expropriation or merely as a restriction on the use of property.206
In order to answer the threshold inquiry the court must first determine whether the
measure is a permanent, or a temporary interference with private property.20 7 For the
measure to be an expropriation, a permanent interference is a necessary, but not a
sufficient, condition. 0 8 Next, the economic sacrifice required of the property owner

198. See European Convention, supra note 187; see also Protocol No. 1 (adding property rights to the
European Convention). Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 provides:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be
deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by
law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provision shall not, however, in
any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of
property in accordance with the general interest ....
Id.
199. See R. Anthony Salgado, Protectionof National'sRights to Property Underthe EuropeanConvention
on Human Rights: Lithgow v. UnitedKingdom, 27 VA. J. OFINT'LL. 865,991 (1987) (discussing right of property).
200. See Antinori, supranote 133, at 1797-98 (discussing a disagreement among delegates as to whether an
international court's review of limitations placed on private property would allow the court to define a state's
economic policies).
201. See id. at 880-90.
202. See James v. United Kingdom, 8 E.H.R.R. 123, 139-40 (1986) (dealing with owners of a large estate
being denied "rights of properties" through the enactment of the Leasehold Reform Act, as amended).
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfatz, Case 44/79, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 42.
206. See id. at 56.
207. See id.
208. See id.
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is considered. 209 Legislative action which does not deprive the property of all
"appreciable economic value" is not expropriation. 2 0 Furthermore, recognizing
that
Member States can restrict the use of property if restriction is deemed necessary for
the protection of the general interest, the ECJ has laid out a "test" to determine the
protection of individual property rights.1
The European Court of Human Rights (Court of Human Rights) developed the
foundations for their "takings" analysis similar to the ECJ.21 2 After the case of
Sporrong and Lonnroth v. Sweden,2 13 the Court of Human Rights determined that
all interferences with private property must be judged in light of the general
principle of the peaceful enjoyment of property.2 14 The Court of Human Rights
holding in Sporrong defines property by reference to all the proprietary interests of
an individual.215 The Court of Human Rights announced a two part test to determine
the permissibility of interferences with private property under the Protocol. 216 "First,
2 17
interferences with private property must pursue an aim in the general interest.
Second, the measure must balance the requirements of the general interest and the
individual's property rights. 21 8 The Court of Human Rights, in a subsequent case,
elaborated that the Member States have a large amount of discretion in determining
whether a measure is in the public interest. 21 9 Furthermore, the Member State's
determination will be upheld, unless the determination is manifestly without
reasonable foundation. 220
Although the implementation of the ECJ and the Court of Human Rights will
not directly effect German takings law, it may effect property owners by providing
added protection.2 1 This added protection comes from an individuals ability to
appeal a decision of the highest constitutional court in Germany, the Federal
Constitutional Court, to the ECJ.222 However, because Member States domestic laws
make up the law governing the ECJ, it is hard to imagine a different outcome in the

209. See id. at 57.
210. See id.

211. See id. at 65-66.
212. See Wolfgang Peukert, Protection of Ownership underArticle Iof the FirstProtocolto the European
Convention on Human Rights, 2 HuM. RTs. L.J. 37, 38 (1981) (discussing the development of Court of Human
Rights case-law).
213. Sporrong andLonnroth, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1982) (cited in Michael R. Antinori, supranote
129, at1799-1801).
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. Antinori,supranote 133, at 1801 (stating that interferences with private property must not, with regard
to the aim pursued, place a disproportionate burden on the individual).
218. Id.
(discussing the requirement of compensation when the burden on the individual is disproportionate
to the aim pursued).
219. See James, 8E.H.R.R. 123.
220. See id.
at142-43.
221. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
222. See id.
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German Court and the ECJ. Therefore, the comparison of eminent domain and
expropriation in Germany and the United States will focus on German legal
doctrines.
IV. COMPARISON OF EMINENT DOMAIN INTHE UNITED
STATES AND GERMANY

A. FoundationalDifferences
Both the United States and Germany place an individual's property rights within
the realm of basic constitutional guarantees.2 3 However, the U.S. Constitution
places fewer limitations on an individuals right to own property than Article 14 of
the Basic Law.224
[The Basic Law] differentiates between (1) expropriation (paragraph 3 of
the article), which requires a specific compensation procedure, reflecting a
fair balance between public and private interests in the public weal, and (2)
determination by law of the content and limits of property rights (paragraph
1 of the article), which does not require compensation. Conversely, the U.S. Constitution merely states that taking private property for a
public use requires just compensation.2 26 The language of the U.S. Constitution does
not define the difference between a permissible act of police power, which does not
require compensation, or a taking, which does require compensation. 227 Instead, the
Supreme Court determines what constitutes a taking requiring just compensation.228
The German Constitution also differs from the U.S. Constitution because it contains
an explicit obligation on property owners to utilize their property for the benefit of
the public. 229 This implicates Germany's "social obligation ofz0 property rights
(Sozialpflichtigkeit des Eigentums, paragraph 2 of the article)."
Article 14 creates a foundational difference in the conditions that underlie an
individual's constitutionally protected property rights in the United States versus

223. See U. S. CONST. amend. V; see also Grundgesetz art. 14 (F.R.G.).
224. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Grundgesetz art. 14 (F.R.G.).
225. Carl-Heinz David, CompensationAspects of the "Takings Issue" in German and American Law: A
ComparativeView, in Takings: Land-Development Conditions and Regulatory Takings afterDolanand Lucas 315,
318 (1996) (comparing the detailed clauses of Article 14 versus the implied elements in Amendment V).
226. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
227. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
228. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); see also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255

(1980).
229. See David, supra note 225, at 318.
230. Id.
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those in Germany. 23' In the United States, a property owner has a bundle of property
rights based solely on his ownership of property. 2 In contrast, property ownership
in Germany is considered a "virtually comprehensive legal position. 233 Thus,
private or public restrictions barring property uses are not contradictory to the
German concept of ownership234 This follows Germany's fundamental property law
which conditions an individual's property rights on whether the property in question
serves an individual or social function.35 This condition lays the foundation for the
differences between United States takings jurisprudence and the laws of
expropriation in Germany. Though fundamental differences exist, the countries
share general commonalities in their taking analyses.
B. PrivateProperty and Public Use
Defining property is a prerequisite to determining an individual's rights
concerning that property. In both the United States and Germany, property rights,
under a takings analysis, tend to focus on an individual's absolute right or
dominance over an object.236 The idea of dominance over property, or the right to
exclude others, is referred to in the United States as one of the "most essential sticks
in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property., 237 In Germany,
the legally permitted dominance over an object allows a property owner to deal with
the object as the owner wishes.38 This includes the right to exclude other persons
from any influence over the property.239
Another similar aspect of property as defined in Germany and the United States
is its broad meaning. 24° In both the German Basic Law and in the U.S. Constitution
one may read "property" to be limited to real property.24' However, the takings issue
242
in both country's property laws extends to both tangible and intangible properties.

231. See KOMMERS, supranote 137, at 250 ("American fundamental law, does not impose duties on private
property or provide that it serve the common good").
232. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (declaring that one of the most important
property rights is the ability to exclude others); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (stating
that property rights are made up of a bundle of sticks).
233. David, supranote 225, at 319.
234. See id.
235. See KOMMERS, supranote 137, at 250.
236. See Kimminich, supra note 129, at 76 (stating that "German civil law defines property rights as the sum
of legally permitted dominance over an object"); see also KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 176; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384
(discussing the bundles of rights characterized as property).
237. KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 176, 180 n.1 1; see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384.
238. See Kimminich, supranote 129, at 76.
239. See id.
240. See NOVAKET. AL., supranote 13, § 2.2, at 10; see also Kimminich, supra note 129, at 76; David, supra
note 225, at 316.
241. See infra note 242.
242. See NOVAK ET. AL., supranote 13, § 2.2, at 10 (discussing the Takings Clauses application to personal
or real, tangible or intangible property); see also Kimminich, supranote 129, at 76 (discussing the Basic Law as
protecting ownership rights of material things as well as financial assets); see also David, supra note 225, at 316
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In the United States, private property is looked at as one element of the Takings
Clause and public use as another.243 Germany on the other hand combines the right
of private property with an individual's responsibility to use their property for the
benefit of society.244 The limitations of Article 14 allow the German legal system to
place restrictions on property use for the benefit of the public welfare without
"violat[ing] fundamental legal understandings about the nature of property rights or
the constitutional rights of ownership. 245
Article 14(2) of the Basic Law further proposes that limits on private property
are permissible for the benefit of the general public by forming the constitutional
basis for legislative acts restricting the exercise of property rights without requiring
compensation.2 46 Thus, "there is no right to compensation when the [restriction on
private property] can be classified as an actualization of the social obligation of
property., 247 This is similar to the distinction in the United States between the power
of eminent domain and the police power.24 8 In Germany, a person may lose his or
her property rights if the Federal Supreme Court determines that the personal
sacrifice is less than the social obligation of property.24 9 Similarly, in the United
States, governmental action which causes a loss of property, either physical or
economic, is not deemed a taking requiring compensation if the restriction is an
action of the police power2 ° Therefore, although the U.S. Constitution does not
place the social obligation of property within the Fifth Amendment, as the German
equivalent does in Article 14(2) of the Basic Law, the ability of governmental police
power to regulate for the benefit of the general welfare places the same sorts of
limitations on the definition of a taking.
The requirement that private property be taken for a public use or for the benefit
of the public weal is an element of takings law in both jurisdictions.2 1 However, the
requirement of specificity, found in the German legal doctrine, has never been
explicitly stated as a requirement for the taking of private property for a public use

(stating that the constitutional doctrine of expropriation extends to other legal positions, such as copyrights and
trademarks).
243. See Hetzel and Gough, supra note 8, at 223-224 (dividing the Takings Clause into four elements).
244. Grundgesetz art. 14 (F.R.G.).
245. Peter Byrne, TenArgumentsforthe Abolition ofthe Regulatory Takings Doctrine,22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89
(1995); see supraalso notes 168-82 and accompanying text (establishing that the contents and limits clause of
Article 14, explicitly limits property rights).
246. See Kimminich, supra note 129, at 86 (discussing Article 14(2) as placing social obligations on the
owner concerning the use of his property).
247. Id.;seealsosupranotes139-63 and accompanying text (mentioning the balancing ofindividual property
rights and social obligations in the Rechstaat and the Sozialstaat).
248. See Hetzel and Gough, supranote 8, at 222 (stating that the police power allows government to regulate
property without paying compensation to protect the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the public).
249. See Kimminich, supra note 129, at 89 (mandating the need for compensation when there has been an
expropriation but not when property is taken in conjunction with its social obligation).
250. See supra notes 19-23, 39 and accompanying text (discussing the police power in relation to the
development of what constitutes a taking).
251. See supranotes 223-24 and accompanying text.
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in the United States.2 Although not explicitly stated, the requirement that property
being taken advances a legitimate state interest implies as much.53 The public
purpose need not be stated with specificity, but needs to be rationally related to the
exercise of eminent domain power25 4 This implies that even though specificity of
purpose is not a required element of the eminent domain power in the United States,
in order for a taking to pass the public use clause of the takings analysis, the
government needs to have a specific purpose that is rationally related to the reason
the land is being taken. Thus, in order to take land for a public use, the government
must be able to specify the plan for the land being expropriated.5
The need for the government to have a specific purpose for expropriated land
stems from Germany's overall view of private property rights. Because Germany
focuses on the balance between an individual's right to property and the social
function of property, defining a specific purpose for property aids the court in
determining the level of scrutiny under which the taken property should be
judged25 6 The court is then able to apply different gradations of protection for
property depending on whether it serves a more social or a more individual
function. 7 Unlike Germany's levels of protection, the U.S. Constitution provides
the same level of protection for an individual's property regardless of whether it
serves an individual or social function25 8 Although the United States does not define
an individual's constitutionally protected property rights according to its function,
if the use and enjoyment of one's property adversely affects the right of others to use
and enjoy their property, property rights limitations may follow. 259 This difference
may be attributable to Germany's dedication to its function as a welfare state.
As a welfare state, Germany furthers its need to balance society and the
individual by devoting itself to achieve social justice, even in the context of an
individual's private property.260 On the other hand, the United States concentrates

252. See David, supranote 225, at 322 (the German legal doctrine requires the public use to be specific due
to the fact that it may be argued that every act of legislation is done for the public good).
253. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261-62 (1980) (allowing the City to zone an area as open
space so that it may not be developed for urban uses).
254. See Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (advocating the need for the
eminent domain power to be rationally related to a conceivable public purpose).
255. See David, supranote 225, at 322. Stating "simply adding land, presently earmarked for no particular
public purpose, to a municipality's land reserve to meet future land demand would not justify expropriation.
However,... if the land were needed for a specific school development designated by a building zoning plan" the
outcome would be different. Id.
256. See supra notes 179-86 and accompanying text.
257. See id.
258. See NOVAK, Er. AL.., supra note 13, § 4.4 at 34 (stating that a property owner in the United States is
protected both under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from interference with "fundamental property rights").
259. See id. (outlining a property owner's rights as being; "the right to use or develop one's property, to
exclude others from using it, and to sell the property for value").
260. See supra notes 256-60, infra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
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its efforts on an individual's rights26' only using society as a justification for
infringing on those rights when the infringement benefits the general welfare of the
public and not for social justice.262
C. The ExpropriationDoctrines
In Germany, the Federal Administrative Court, the Federal Supreme Court and
the Federal Constitutional Court have developed tests or criteria for distinguishing
between a taking and social obligation.263 The tests have been referred to as
threshold tests to distinguish constitutional from unconstitutional measures affecting
property.264 Recent reformation of the property rights doctrine by the Federal
Constitutional Court may soon disregard these tests.265 However, currently, these
three courts each employ a different criteria. German courts use either the doctrine
of intensity, the doctrine of individual sacrifice, the doctrine of situational
commitment, or the private use test to determine when property has been
unconstitutionally taken.2 6
1.

The Doctrine ofIntensity

Although there is a distinction between the United States and Germany's
reasons and values behind the protection of private property, the foundational
takings analysis recognized by the Federal Administrative Court in Germany
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht),2 67 is remarkably similar to that of the United States.2 68
In the United States, the line drawn between a taking and a proper exercise of the
police power focuses on whether the restriction "substantially advances legitimate
land., 269
state interests" and does not "deny an owner economically viable use of his
In the Federal Administrative Court, a restriction on an individual's property
becomes expropriation when "the administrative measure directed against the
property" and "the burden placed upon the owner ... transgress the borderline of

261. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that persons shall not be deprived of "life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law").
262. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
263. See LUNDMARK,LANDSCAPE, RECREATION, ANDTAKINGSiNGERMANANDAMERiCANLAW225 (1997)
(discussing the different "tests" each court in Germany uses in a takings analysis).
264. See id. at 226.
265. See id. at 225.
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. See supranotes 63-107 and accompanying text (discussing how the foundational takings analysis in the
United States depends on the type of infringement that has occurred); see alsoKimminich, supranote 129, at 87-88.
269. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980) (weighing public and private interests).
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the social obligation of property."270 This is called the doctrine of intensity,
the so
272
27
called reasonableness test (Zumutbarkeitstheorie), 1 or the burden test.
The doctrine of intensity functions so the reasonableness of a restriction varies
according to the degree of social obligation that encumbers the property.273 Social
obligation allows restrictions on private property that are bearable and not
unreasonable.27 4 "The unbearableness of a harsh limitation of ownership in the sense
of the unreasonableness theory reveals itself as proof that this restriction has
exceeded the boundaries of social obligation, becoming an expropriative intrusion
against property."275 In order to determine what is unbearable and what is
reasonable, the Federal Administrative Court attempts to assess the burden, the
impact, and the intensity of a particular restriction.2 76 The United States participates
in a similar analysis by examining the economic impact of a regulation on the
property owner, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with the owners
investment backed expectations, and the character of the action involved.277 The
German assessment of the burden, impact, and intensity mirror the Penn Central
factors in the United States. Hence, the analysis in both the United States and in the
Federal Administrative Court of Germany begin with the balancing of the burden
on the property owner with the interests of the state or society. However, because
Germany's courts are not in agreement as to the use of the doctrine of intensity, the
country employs three additional doctrines to determine whether the infringement
by the government has crossed the line from taking property in conjunction with
one's social obligation to expropriation. 278
2. The Doctrine of IndividualSacrifice
One of the additional tests applied in a German takings analysis is the doctrine
of individual sacrifice (Sonderopfertheorie) 279 which is used by the Federal Supreme

270. Kimminich, supranote 129, at 87 (discussing the doctrine of intensity and the need for a dividing line
between expropriation and social obligation in order to determine when compensation must be paid).
271. See LUNDMARK, supranote 263, at 232.
272. See id. (the test attempts to assess the burden, impact, or intensity of a restriction on a particular piece
of property).
273. See id. ("social obligation of ownership means that the owner must, without compensation, accede to
restrictions that are common, satisfactory, and reasonable").
274. See id.
275. Id.
276. See id. at 287 (comparing diminution of value with the reasonableness test).
277. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
278. See Kimminich, supra note 129, at 87-88. (discussing the Federal Supreme Court's development of the
"doctrine of individual sacrifice"). The Federal Administrative Court repudiated the "doctrine of individual
sacrifice" and adheres to the "doctrine of intensity." Id. at 87. Finally, both courts adhere to the "doctrine of
situational commitment." Id. at 88.
279. See LUNDMARK, supra note 263, at 226 (translating Sonderopfertheorie as Special Sacrifice Test).
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Court (Bundesgerichtshof).2 8 ° It characterizes expropriation as a "breach of the
principle of equality because it forces [the individual property owner] to make a
special sacrifice., 28' Thus, a taking exists if a restriction constitutes a "special
sacrifice" for one owner and other owners similarly situated are not also burdened.2 82
Though on its face the idea of individual sacrifice seems to contradict the
Takings Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court made a similar pronouncement regarding
the priorities of individual rights and public duties.283 In Armstrong v. UnitedStates,
and Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal Commission, the Court stated the purpose of the
Takings Clause was to "bar government from forcing some people alone to bear the
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as
a whole." 284 What is not explicitly stated in this quotation is implied through
reference to the Takings Clause. One person should not be required to bear a public
burden "without just compensation. 2 85 Therefore, the doctrine of individual
sacrifice, in Germany, allows the government to require a person to give up his or
her individual property rights if they conflict with the public welfare so long as
compensation is paid.28 6 Similarly, the United States may require an individual to
give up his or her property rights to protect the health, safety, morals, and general
welfare of the public under the exercise of police power.287 Though these doctrines
are similar, differences surfaces as to when compensation is due by each
government.
In the United States, valid acts of the police power do not require just
compensation.2 88 In Germany, administrative measures classified as an actualization
of the social obligation of property do not require just compensation. 289 The social
obligation theory appears to be the equivalent of the exercise of police power in the
United States. However, in contrast, it appears the principle of sacrifice requires
compensation any time an individual sacrifices his or her specific rights or

280. See Kimminich, supra note 129, at 87; see also LUNDMARK, supra note 263, at 226. The doctrine of
individual sacrifice is criticized because "special sacrifice" is seen merely as another expression for "unfair." Id.
281. Kimminich, supranote 129, at 87 (discussing the "historic" Federal Court decision on June 10, 1952
and the criticism of the doctrine due to its reliance on formal criterion); see also David, supranote 225, at 317 ("the
principle of sacrifice states that if individual rights and benefits clash with public welfare rights and duties, the latter
must take priority over the former; however, the state must compensate those who sacrifice their special right or
advantages for the common good").
282. See LUNDMARK, supranote 263, at 226-27 (noting that "in effect, the special sacrifice test holds that all
such limitations, no matter how harsh, are constitutional as long as they affect all similarly situated property owners
equally").
283. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
284. Id.; see also Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 834 n.4 (1987).
285. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
286. See LUNDMARK, supra note 263, at 289 (stating that "the payment of compensation is seen as the
constitutionally required mechanism to restore the balance of equality among landowners").
287. See supranotes 17-18 and accompanying text; see also David,supranote225, at317; Kimminich, supra
note 129, at 87-88.
288. See Hetzel and Gough, supranote 8, at 222 ("Unlike the power of eminent domain, an exercise of the
police power does not require government compensation for its acquisition of, or imposition on, private property").
289. See Kimminich, supra note 129, at 86.
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advantages for the common good. 290 If this is the case, the doctrine of individual
sacrifice requires compensation regardless of where the line is drawn between the
fulfillment of one's social obligation to property and expropriation. 29' Thus, if the
United States adhered to a doctrine similar to the doctrine of individual sacrifice, a
restriction based on the government's police power would trigger compensation.
3. The Doctrineof SituationalCommitment
Another test applied in Germany to determine if a taking exists has been
accepted by both the Federal Administrative Court and the Federal Supreme Court
as a solution to the issue of equality found in both the doctrine of intensity and the
doctrine of individual sacrifice.292 The doctrine of situational commitment or
situational limitations (Situationsgebundenheit) 293 rests upon the fact certain objects
of property are "by nature burdened with a greater amount of social obligation than
others. 294 Therefore, a property owner must take encumbrances burdening their
property as part of the social obligation of ownership. 295 The doctrine's application

is frequently seen in the areas of zoning and planning 296
law, pollution control,

conservation of nature, and the protection of historic sites.
Although in the United States there does not appear to be a doctrine which is the
exact equivalent to the doctrine of situational commitment, the U.S. Supreme Court
in Penn Central used similar reasoning. In Penn Central, the Court found that
although UGP Properties was not permitted to construct a multi-story office building
on top of the terminal, the owner still enjoyed one reasonable use of his property so
a taking had not occurred.297 In making the determination that a taking did not occur
when construction was prohibited on a landmark located on private property, the

290. See David, supra note 225, at 317 (noting that the principle of sacrifice was codified in the Prussian
General Land Law of 1794 and is considered no longer valid); but see Kimminich, supra note 129, at 87 (discussing
the Federal Courts use of the doctrine of individual sacrifice).
291. See LUNDMARK, supra note 263, at 221-24 (describing the implementation of reimbursement for
individual sacrifices which cause hardship). Notice that the idea of content regulation requiring reimbursement is
not the same as a taking requiring compensation. Id.
292. See Kimminich, supranote 129, at 88 n.47 (stating that actualization of the social obligation burdens
only a limited number of property owners).
293. See LUNDMARK, supranote 263, at 228.
294. Kimminich, supranote 129, at 88. This doctrine establishes "that the protected sphere ofproperty rights
cannot be determined by abstract reasoning; it requires that the owner's legal position be alterable, depending upon
the settling and environment in which the property is located." See id. (citing Rudolf Dolzer, Property and
Environment: The Social ObligationInherentin Ownership, in IUCN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW PAPER
No. 12 25 (1976); see also LUNDMARK, supra note 263, at 228. "Every parcel is encumbered by its location,
features, and function in nature. In other words, it bears the stamp of its 'situation."' Id.
295. See LUNDMARK, supranote 263, at 228 (noting that the situational limitations placed on an owners
property, "impose immediate constraints on the owner's rights of use and disposition" of the property).
296. See Kimminich, supranote 129, at 88.
297. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 104 (1978) (stating that "appellants cannot
establish a "taking" simply by showing that they have been denied the ability to exploit the super-jacent airspace,
irrespective of the remainder of appellants' parcel").
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Court in essence found that the Terminal was burdened with a greater amount of
social obligation than other private property due to its landmark status. Thus, the use
of the remaining property is reasonable for the property owner, because he is still
gaining revenue from the Terminal and is also reasonable for the locality, because
it preserves a landmark site for the benefits of the public. Therefore, the U.S.
Supreme Court seems to burden owners of historic landmarks with higher social
obligations, similar to Germany's use of the doctrine of situational commitment,
which is based solely on the nature of the property.
4. The Private Use Test
The final approach to the balancing of an individual's social obligation with the
taking determination is the private use test (Privatnuzigkeitstheorie). 298 The Federal
Supreme Court, the Federal Administrative Court, and the Federal Constitutional
Court, with variations, use the Privatnuzigkeitstheorie. 299 This test states it is
constitutionally permissible "to prohibit a proposed future use of property 1) the
present use of the property is profitable, 2) the property has never been put to the
proposed use; and 3) if the proposed use would not be compatible with the location
or conditions of the property. ' 3°° The private use test is unlike anything considered
by the United States because it looks solely to the property to determine the
constitutionality of taking the property, and not to the individual property owner.
D. Just Compensation
In both Germany and the United States the taking of property requires payment
of compensation.30 ' The key legal issue in the determination of compensation is
whether the impact on an individual's land constitutes a taking or merely a
determination of the content or social obligation of property rights.3 0 2 Such a
determination in the United States would be a valid exercise of the police power.0 3
In the United States, the just compensation element of the Takings Clause acts as the

298. See LUNDMARK,supra note 263, at 229 (stating that the private use testis an improvement by the Federal
Supreme Court of their situational limitations test).
299. See id. at 230.
300. Id. at 229-30 ('The dividing line between social obligation and expropriation or content regulation is
always traversed if the private use of the subject property is destroyed as a result of permanent limitations in use").
301. See NOVAK Er. AL., supra note 13, § 4.4, at 35 (establishing that the "cardinal rule of condemnation is
the requirement ofjust compensation"); see also Kimminich, supranote 129, at 89 (setting forth the unequivocal
rule as requiring compensation for an expropriation).
302. See Davidsupranote225, at 319 (discussing when compensation is an issue in Germany's expropriation
analysis). "The constitutional protection of property rights ...result[s] in the necessity of distinguishing between
those restrictions or infringements imposed by government regulations or actions on private property rights that
require compensation, and those that do not." Id. at 327.
303. See id.
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only restriction on the governments eminent domain power. °4 However, in
Germany, the taking of private property is also restricted by the contents and limits
clause of Article 14.305 Therefore, according to Article 14(3), a law that results in a
taking of private property is constitutional only if the law simultaneously regulates
the type and amount of compensation. 306 The regulation of compensation is found
in several statutory provisions for regulatory interference with property rights.3 7 In
contrast, in the United States, just compensation is the fair market value of the
property that has been taken considering the property in its totality.30 8 Consequently,
though both Germany and the United States require compensation to be paid for the
taking of property, the United States depends on case law to determine if the action
amounts to a taking while Germany focuses on statutory provisions.3 9
V. CONCLUSION

Although foundations for constitutionally protected property rights in the United
States and Germany were based on the works of two different philosophers, in
application, the two countries tend to focus on the same aspects of property
ownership. While both countries require that property rights be constitutionally
guaranteed, Germany and the United States also allow regulation of private property
in order to benefit the public. The German Constitution explicitly states this social
obligation, while the United States uses case law to discern the authority granted to
the government in its police power. Under both practices, property may be infringed
upon so long as it is legitimately based on a benefit to the public. Germany and the
United States are also similar in the requirement that if the regulation of property
crosses over the line between a justified act of the police power and the fulfillment
of one's social obligation, the property has been taken. Once property is taken,
compensation is required. Thus, both Constitutions declare that the right to property
and the protection from unauthorized takings is a fundamental right.

304. See Katharina Richter, Compensable Regulation in the FederalRepublic of Germany, 5 ARIZ. J. INT'L.
& CoMP. L 34, 46 (1988). "The Fifth Amendment is not designed to limit the governmental interferences with
property rights perse, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting
to a taking."First English Evangelical Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles, 107 S.Ct. 2378,2386 (1987) (emphasis
supplied).
305. See supra notes 173-86 and accompanying text.
306. See Grundgesetz art. 14(3)(F.R.G.); see also Richter, supra note 304, at 52 (noting that regulatory
restrictions that are severe are valid underthe "savings clause" ofArticle 14(3) because the Baugesetzbuth (BauGB),
federal zoning legislation, sets forth the types and amount of compensation to be paid).
307. Richter, supra note 304, at 52 ("BauGB §§ 39-44 require damages for a loss or reduction of the value
of property resulting from local land use decisions which fall short of an actual physical taking of property").
308. See supra notes 35, 108-24 and accompanying text.
309. See Richter,supranote 304, at 52-61 (outlining that statutes which require compensation for a reduction
in the value of property due to a regulation).

